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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
APPELLEE, 
: PRIORITY NO. 2 
v. (defendant is incarcerated) 
BRETT LARSEN, 
: Case No. 990265-CA 
APPELLANT. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this 
criminal case involving misdemeanor convictions. 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the convictions for negligent homicide? 
Because this trial was a bench trial, this Court will review the evidence on appeal 
to determine if the verdicts were "against the clear weight of the evidence," or if the 
Court "otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Larsen recognizes that if he were to challenge any factual finding made by the trial 
court, it would be his burden to marshal the evidence in support of the finding and then 
explain why the evidence was insufficient. See eg, Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 
776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). 
In this instance, it is primarily the trial court's legal, as opposed to factual, 
reasoning which is at issue. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, Larsen will 
marshal the evidence in the argument portion of his brief. 
It appears that this issue was at least partially preserved when trial counsel moved 
to dismiss counts 1-3 in closing arguments (Docket page 6, T. 126-132). 
To the extent that the issue was not properly preserved, Larsen will be relying on 
the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines in seeking relief on appeal. 
To demonstrate plain error, Larsen must establish that an obvious and harmful 
error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the 
obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is 
more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See e ^ State v. 
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 1989). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Larsen must demonstrate that 
trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, 
and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e ^ Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), ceil denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice prong 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable probability 
of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. See e.g. 
State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909. 913 (Utah 1988). 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction of failure to yield? 
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Because this trial was a bench trial, this Court will review the evidence on appeal 
to determine if the verdicts were "against the clear weight of the evidence," or if the 
Court "otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Larsen recognizes that if he were to challenge any factual finding made by the trial 
court, it would be his burden to marshal the evidence in support of the finding and then 
explain why the evidence was insufficient. See e.g. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 
776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). 
In this instance, it is primarily the trial court's legal, as opposed to factual, 
reasoning which is at issue. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, Larsen will 
marshal the evidence in the argument portion of his brief. 
Trial counsel did not move to dismiss count 4, or argue insufficiency of the 
evidence, but left the issue to the trial court's discretion in closing arguments (Docket 
page 6, T. 126-132). 
To the extent that the issue was not properly preserved, Larsen will be relying on 
the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines in seeking relief on appeal. 
To demonstrate plain error, Larsen must establish that an obvious and harmful 
error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the 
obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is 
more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See e ^ State v. 
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 1989). 
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( 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Larsen must demonstrate that 
trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, 
and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. 
Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice prong 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable probability 
of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. See e.g. 
State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909. 913 (Utah 1988V 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertain and appear in 
full text in the addendum: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I §12 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
Utah Code Ann. §32A-12-209 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-55 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-118 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION 
On September 1, 1998, a police officer issued a citation to Mr. Larsen for an 
improper left turn and for violation of the "not a drop" law, offenses which allegedly 
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occurred on June 28, 1998 (R. 1). 
The State filed an information charging Larsen with Negligent Collision, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of § 11.12.090 of the Salt Lake County Ordinances (R. 6-7). 
The State subsequently filed an amended information charging Larsen with one 
count of negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-206, with one count of possession of alcohol by a minor, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §32A-12-209, with one count of open container, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.20, and with failure to yield the 
right of way, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 (R. 14-
16). 
On February 5, 1999, Judge Michael K. Burton presided over a bench trial and 
convicted Larsen on all counts as charged, and Dean H. Becker initially represented Mr. 
Larsen (docket page 1, R. 3, 8, 31). 
On March 16, 1999, Judge Burton sentenced Larsen to one year in jail, six months 
in jail, three months in jail, and three months in jail, to run consecutively (R. 32-34, 53-
55). 
Larsen filed a notice of appeal on March 16, 1999 (R. 50). 
Dean Becker withdrew from representing Mr. Larsen, and Manny Garcia entered 
his appearance of counsel (R. 84). 
Larsen moved this Court to remand the case to the trial court pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B. This Court denied the motion in an order filed 
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June 15, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 28, 1998, Kara Shinners-Little died as a result of injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident involving the car Mr. Larsen was driving and the car being driven by 
Douglas King (T. 24, 105). The following facts describe the circumstances of the 
accident. 
On June 28, 1998, shortly before 9:00 p.m., Larsen, then nineteen years of age, 
was driving a green Ford Ranger northbound on Wasatch Boulevard (T. 16-19, 22). He 
began a left turn off of Wasatch and onto 3800 South, and his right front end collided 
with the left front end of a blue 1990 Subaru Legacy station wagon which had been going 
south in the outside lane on Wasatch (T. 17, 22, 40, 60, 86, 95, 111).1 
The police found a partially full whiskey bottle resting on the passenger side of 
Larsen's Ranger, after Larsen's Ranger had collided with the Subaru and came to rest on 
its side (T. 34-35, 39, 42).2 Larsen's blood alcohol level was .009%, or less than .01% 
(T. 51-52). This was far below the D.U.I, standard of .08% applicable to adults, but 
above the 0% limit for persons under 21 years of age (T. 54, 55).3 A .009% test would 
1
 Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 requires cars making a left-hand turn to yield to 
oncoming cars which pose an immediate hazard. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.20 forbids carrying open containers of alcohol in 
passenger compartments of cars being driven on public highways. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. §32A-12-209 forbids minors to consume alcohol. 
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normally be considered a negative test (T. 56). 
The driver of the Subaru, Douglas King, testified that he did not know how fast he 
was going, but estimated that his speed at the time of the collision was somewhere in 
between 40 and 45 miles an hour (T. 115). A citizen who was behind Larsen in the 
turning lane estimated that King's Subaru was traveling at 45 to 55 miles an hour (T. 71-
72).4 The speed limit on Wasatch Boulevard was 40 miles an hour (T. 21). 
King and his three passengers were headed to a party and intending to turn off of 
Wasatch at approximately 4600 South (T. 110-111). 
King testified that he had been traveling south on Wasatch Boulevard in the inside, 
left-hand lane, but as he approached the intersection of Wasatch and 38th, he moved into 
the right hand lane to pass another driver who was in the left-hand lane (T. 113).5 He 
testified that he shifted into fifth gear (which he normally did when the car was going 
about 40 miles an hour), went up a small crest of a hill about 200 yards from the 
4
 The State's accident reconstructionist was unable to determine the speed of the 
Subaru because of insufficient data (T. 91). 
Larsen's motion for a remand pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B and 
accompanying affidavit allege that Larsen's mother provided trial counsel with evidence that the 
combined speed of the cars involved in the accident was between 110 and 120 miles an hour. 
Larsen renews his motion for a remand, should the Court not otherwise reverse his conviction for 
negligent homicide. 
5
 Utah drivers are generally to pass in the left-hand lane, and are to pass on the right 
only when it is safe to do so. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-55 (indicating drivers are to pass 
in the left lane) with Utah Code Ann. §41-6-56 (stating conditions in which one may pass on the 
right). 
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intersection, moved into the right lane and passed the other car (T. 113-115).6 He then 
saw Larsen's truck and drove into it a split second later without time to brake or take any 
other evasive action (T. 115-116). 
King could not say why he did not see the truck sooner, indicating that he may 
have been mildly distracted by conversation, but not distracted enough to take his eyes 
offthe traffic (T. 118, 119).7 
Larsen did not testify, the but driver of the car in the turning lane behind Larsen, J. 
Henry Larsen, witnessed the collision, and indicated that prior to entering the 
intersection, Larsen had stopped appropriately at a red light, waited a few moments after 
the light turned green, and then proceeded to turn directly through the intersection at a 
normal rate of speed, perhaps at ten or fifteen miles an hour (T. 58, 61). He was not sure 
if Larsen signaled his turn, and King did not see Larsen signal, but indicated that the 
signal may have been between blinks when he saw the truck prior to the crash (T. 58, 
115). 
6
 Utah Code Ann. §41-6-58 is interpreted as forbidding cars to pass within one 
hundred feet of an intersection. See Hathaway v. Marx. 439 P.2d 850, 850 (Utah 1968). 
Utah law recognizes intersections and hill crests as hazards which normally may require 
driving under the posted speed limit. See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-46(l)(a) and (c). 
7
 While the State's witness testified that oncoming traffic has no legal duty to yield 
to anything that should not be in front of it (T. 97), the law actually does recognize the duty of all 
drivers to maintain a proper lookout. See Richards v. Palace Laundry Co.. 186 P. 439, 442 (Utah 
1919); Martin v. Sheffield. 189 P.2d 127, 130-131 (Utah 1948); Hughes v. Hooper. 431 P.2d 
983, 983-84 (1967); Country Club Foods v. Barney. 352 P.2d 776, 777 (Utah 1960); Childs v. 
Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 434 (Utah 1998). 
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J. Henry Larsen could see King's Subaru from 50 to 75 yards away prior to the 
collision (T. 69). He estimated that it was traveling at 45 to 55 miles an hour (T. 71-72). 
He and the State's accident reconstructionist agreed that neither the Subaru nor the 
Ranger made any effort to avoid one another (T. 72, 92). There were no skid marks from 
either car (T. 83). 
The road surface was dry and the intersection of the collision was well lit (T. 20). 
There was no evidence that either the Ranger or the Subaru had the headlights on, but it 
was still light out and the sun was not yet set at the time of the collision (T. 25, 69, 115).8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to justify a conviction of negligent homicide, the State had the burden to 
show that Larsen was the proximate cause of the death of the deceased. The evidence 
before the trial court, even when marshaled in favor of the trial court's findings, 
established that the unlawful driving of Douglas King, the driver of the Subaru, was the 
intervening cause of her death. 
Assuming arguendo that the State proved that Larsen was the proximate cause of 
the deceased's death, the State did not establish that her death was a foreseeable 
consequence of Larsen's conduct, given the unexpectable unlawful driving pattern of 
King. 
While the State's witness testified that the law requires headlights to be activated 
half an hour prior to sunset (T. 25), Utah Code Ann. §41-6-118 actually requires headlights to be 
activated one half hour after sunset. 
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Assuming that the State established foreseeability and thus negligence, the 
negligence proved did not rise to the level of criminal negligence. 
The evidence, when properly marshaled in favor of the trial court's findings, and 
in fact, when viewed according to those findings, fails to establish that Larsen failed to 
yield with the requisite criminal intent of knowledge. As the evidence reflected and the 
trial court recognized, Larsen failed to see King's Subaru, and thus, he did not fail to 
yield to a known hazard. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO JUSTIFY THE NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE CONVICTION. 
Judge Burton's oral findings at the conclusion of the trial regarding the negligent 
homicide charge were as follow: 
And obviously, the question upon which the whole case is focused 
and which is the most serious, of course, is the negligent homicide. A 
factor on that matter is, I think important to note, that Mr. J. Larsen notes 
that as the light turned green for Mr. Brett Larsen, that he waited a few 
moments, then he moved into the intersection. Mr. J. Larsen describes the 
turn as not being slow and not being fast, just a casual, normal turn, and I 
took it to mean that Mr. Brett Larsen was turning as if it were a clear 
intersection. 
Mr. J. Larsen, sitting behind Mr. Brett Larsen, can see the other 
motor vehicle approaching the intersection, so it's clear that the vehicle was 
visible. And finally, Deputy Stratford tells us that Mr. Brett Larsen's truck 
tire was moving at the time of the impact, indicating that he made no effort 
to stop. 
Now, with those findings of fact, then we come to the standard that 
must be applied, which both sides have recited. Should Mr. Brett Larsen 
have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was taking or 
which might occur when he took that risk? And was this risk of such a 
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nature and degree that his failure to perceive it constituted a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from Mr. Brett Larsen's standpoint? 
And I have to say, though it's been ably argued and the facts 
presented, it's clear to me that this is a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person has to exercise. Were that not true, it would 
not be possible to drive a motor vehicle on any roadway that ever 
intersected with another roadway. 
I mean, Mr. Brett Larsen's actions today, due to these facts, has to 
be a gross deviation. Essentially, he drove into the intersection, turned left, 
and made no perceptive view of the oncoming traffic. And if one were to 
do that, and it would just be a simple deviation or to be the normal 
procedure, it could not be tolerated in any way. So on the count criminal — 
negligent homicide, I find the Defendant guilty based on the facts 
presented. 
(T. 138-139). 
The following evidence is marshaled in support of the trial court's factual analysis 
regarding the negligent homicide count. 
J. Henry Larsen witnessed the collision and indicated that prior to entering the 
intersection, Larsen had stopped appropriately at a red light, waited a few moments after 
the light turned green, and then proceeded to turn directly through the intersection at a 
normal rate of speed, perhaps at ten or fifteen miles an hour (T. 58, 61). 
It appears that the trial court may have misunderstood Deputy Stratford's 
testimony that Larsen's wheel made a striated yaw mark on the road, demonstrating that 
the wheel of the car was turning when it made the marks (T. 84). However, the evidence 
was uncontroverted that Brett Larsen made no effort to stop prior to the collision. J. 
Henry Larsen and the State's accident reconstructionist agreed that neither the Subaru nor 
the Ranger made any effort to avoid one another (T. 72, 92). There were no skid marks 
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from either car (T. 83). 
The driver behind Larsen, J. Henry Larsen, could see King's Subaru from 50 to 75 
yards away prior to the collision (T. 69), and estimated that it was traveling at 45 to 55 
miles an hour (T. 71-72). 
While the Subaru was obviously visible to J. Henry Larsen, it may not have been 
to Brett Larsen. The Subaru was obviously closer to Brett Larsen than it was to J. Henry 
Larsen, and a car traveling at the rate of the Subaru covers such a distance quickly. See 
e.g. State in re K.K.H.. 610 P.2d 849, 855-56 (Utah 1980)("It should be observed that a 
vehicle traveling 25 miles per hour moves at the rate of 36.6 feet per second and one 
traveling 30 miles per hour at the rate of 44 feet per second."). The Subaru may well 
have come over the hill crest, and come out from the slow-moving car in the left lane (T. 
113-115), and thus into Brett Larsen's range of view, after Larsen looked ahead on 
Wasatch Boulevard and saw that the way was clear, and properly diverted his attention to 
38th South to insure that he made the turn accurately and without hitting any hazard on 
that street, for the driver of the Subaru, King, testified that he did not see Larsen's truck 
until the collision (T. 118), confirming that King darted out of the left lane from behind 
the slower car suddenly before entering the intersection. 
The State's accident reconstructionist was asked if he was competent to opine on 
gross deviations from the standard of care, and he said he had his opinions (T. 92-93). 
He indicated that he did not know the legal standard, but personally interpreted the phrase 
as indicating when "an individual does something that is beyond what a normal individual 
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might do, more serious,. . . with more serious risks." (T. 93). He did not interview 
witnesses, but just interpreting the physical evidence remaining after the collision, he saw 
no evidence of a gross deviation (T. 94, 96). He then opined that taking a left turn in 
front of a car traveling 40 to 45 miles an hour when the front corners of the car collided 
and when there were no indications of braking would indicate a gross deviation from the 
standard of care (T. 96-97). 
The trial court's errors were primarily legal. As is discussed further below, the 
trial court failed to consider the evidence indicating that Larsen was not the legal cause of 
the deceased's death, a thus failed to consider a necessary element of the offense. 
Further, the trial court failed to recognize the State's failure to establish that the 
deceased's death was a foreseeable consequence of Larsen's driving, given the grossly 
negligent driving of Douglas King, the driver of the Subaru. Finally, the trial court 
misunderstood the definition of criminal negligence in entering the conviction. 
A. LARSEN WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 defines the offense of negligent homicide, as follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
Proving that Larsen was the proximate cause of death was an essential element. 
See e.g. State v. Hallett 619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980). 
A review of the trial court's ruling indicates that the trial court never addressed 
whether Larsen caused the death of Kara Skinners-Little, a necessary element of the 
13 
offense (T. 137-139). 
There is no need to remand this case to the trial court for additional findings under Rule 
of Civil Procedure 52, for the relevant evidence is uncontroverted that the grossly 
negligent driving of Douglas King was the intervening proximate cause of Kara Skinners-
Little's death. 
"Proximate cause is the cause which through its natural and foreseeable 
consequence, unbroken by any sufficient intervening cause, produces the injury which 
would not have occurred but for that cause." Hallett 619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980). An 
intervening cause is an intervening and independent act of a third party which is the 
proximate cause, which the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen in the exercise 
of ordinary care. See e,g. State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 and n.4 (Utah 1984). 
The record in this case demonstrates that it was the driving of Douglas King, the 
driver of the Subaru, that was the intervening proximate cause of Kara Skinners-Little's 
death. By undisputed evidence including Douglas King's own admissions, King was 
going above the speed limit (T. 21, 115, 71-72)9 while approaching an intersection and 
9
 The State's accident reconstructionist was unable to determine the speed of the 
Subaru because of insufficient data (T. 91). 
Larsen's motion for a remand pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B and 
accompanying affidavit allege that Larsen's mother provided trial counsel with evidence that the 
combined speed of the cars involved in the accident was between 110 and 120 miles an hour. 
Larsen renews his motion for a remand, should the Court not otherwise reverse his conviction for 
negligent homicide. 
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at the crest of a hill (T. 113-115),10 and came out of the left lane from behind a slower 
car and passed the car in the right-hand lane (T. 113),11 while perhaps mildly distracted, 
without maintaining a proper lookout,12 without insuring that it was safe to do so (T. 
115-116, 118, 119),13 and immediately prior to or while he was entering an intersection.14 
It was clearly King's gross negligence, and not Larsen's failure to see the Subaru 
which was the proximate cause of the death in this case. Compare Hallett 619 P.2d 335 
(Utah 1980)(defendants were criminally negligent when they bent a stop sign until it was 
parallel to the street; deceased's speeding was not the intervening cause, where trial court 
may not have believed that the deceased's having earlier passed someone going the speed 
limit meant she had been speeding at the time of the accident, where deceased likely 
would have stopped had stop sign been visible, and where it might reasonably have been 
10
 Utah law recognizes intersections and hill crests as hazards which normally may 
require driving under the posted speed limit. See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-46(l)(a) and (c). 
11
 Utah drivers are generally to pass in the left-hand lane, and are to pass on the right 
only when it is safe to do so. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-55 (indicating drivers are to pass 
in the left lane) with Utah Code Ann. §41-6-56 (stating conditions in which one may pass on the 
right). 
12
 The law recognizes the duty of all drivers to maintain a proper lookout. 
See Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 186 P. 439, 442 (Utah 1919); Martin v. Sheffield, 189 P.2d 
127, 130-131 (Utah 1948); Hughes v. Hooper, 431 P.2d 983, 983-84 (1967); Country Club 
Foods v. Barney. 352 P.2d 776, 777 (Utah 1960); Childs v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 434 (Utah 
1998). 
13
 The law requires those passing on the right to do so only when it is safe. Compare 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-55 (indicating drivers are to pass in the left lane) with Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-56 (stating conditions in which one may pass on the right). 
14
 Utah Code Ann. §41-6-58 is interpreted as forbidding cars to pass within one 
hundred feet of an intersection. See Hathaway v. Marx, 439 P.2d 850, 850 (Utah 1968). 
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found that the deceased's conduct was foreseeable). 
B. LARSEN WAS NOT CIVILLY NEGLIGENT BECAUSE THE DRIVING PATTERN 
OF KING WAS NOT REASONABLY FORESEEABLE. 
Utah law recognizes foreseeability as an element not only of causation, but also of 
negligence. See e.g. Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 
(Utah 1993) (foreseeability is required to establish both negligence and proximate 
cause). 
Review of the trial court's findings establishes that he did not consider this 
element (T. 137-139). However, the relevant evidence in this case is undisputed, and this 
Court can independently conclude that acting within the ordinary course of care, Larsen 
could not have reasonably foreseen King's grossly negligent driving, which resulted in 
the Subaru's sudden emergence in the intersection. 
The driver of the Subaru, King, testified that he did not see Larsen's truck until the 
collision (T. 118), confirming that King darted out of the left lane from behind the 
slower car suddenly before entering the intersection. The driver behind Brett Larsen, J. 
Henry Larsen, could only see King's Subaru from 50 to 75 yards away prior to the 
collision (T. 69), and estimated that it was traveling at 45 to 55 miles an hour (T. 71-72). 
The Subaru was obviously closer to Brett Larsen than it was to J. Henry Larsen, and a car 
traveling at the rate of the Subaru covers such a distance quickly at the rate of speed 
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being driven by the Subaru.15 The Subaru may well have come over the hill crest, and 
come out from the slow-moving car in the left lane (T. 113-115), and thus into Brett 
Larsen's range of view, after Larsen looked ahead on Wasatch Boulevard and saw that 
the way was clear, and properly diverted his attention to 38th South to insure that he 
made the turn accurately and without hitting any hazard on that street. 
Particularly given King's grossly negligent driving, Kara Skinners-Little's death 
was not a foreseeable consequence of Larsen's left turn. See Steffensen. supra 
(recognizing that foreseeability is factor to be considered in proximate cause and 
negligence inquiries). 
C. LARSEN WAS NOT CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT. 
The negligent homicide statute requires that the defendant act with criminal 
negligence in causing the death of another. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) indicates that one acts 
[w]ith criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor?s standpoint. 
While the trial court essentially repeated the relevant statutory language at the 
15
 See e ^ State in re K.K.H.. 610 P.2d 849, 855-56 (Utah 1980)("It should be 
observed that a vehicle traveling 25 miles per hour moves at the rate of 36.6 feet per second 
and one traveling 30 miles per hour at the rate of 44 feet per second."). 
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outset of his ruling on the negligent homicide conviction (T. 138), review of his ruling 
demonstrates that his application of that standard was legally erroneous, and that he 
apparently believed that a finding of no gross negligence in this case was equivalent to a 
finding that Larsen's driving was within the ordinary course of care, or not negligent 
under the terms of simple negligence. He stated, 
Now, with those findings of fact, then we come to to the standard 
that must be applied, which both sides have recited. Should Mr. Brett 
Larsen have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was 
taking or which might occur when he took that risk? And was this risk of 
such a nature and degree that his failure to perceive it constituted a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from Mr. Brett Larsen's standpoint? 
And I have to say, though it's been ably argued and the facts 
presented, it's clear to me that this is a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person has to exercise. Were that not true, it would 
not be possible to drive a motor vehicle on any roadway that ever 
intersected with another roadway. 
I mean, Mr. Brett Larsen's actions today, due to these facts, has to 
be a gross deviation. Essentially, he drove into the intersection, turned left, 
and made no perceptive view of the oncoming traffic. And if one were to 
do that, and it would just be a simple deviation or to be the normal 
procedure, it could not be tolerated in any way. So on the count criminal — 
negligent homicide, I find the Defendant guilty based on the facts 
presented. 
(T. 138-139). 
A review of Utah law demonstrates that the trial court was legally erroneous in this 
respect, for it would have been legally permissible to recognize that Larsen's driving was 
not within the acceptable bounds of the ordinary standard of care, or simply negligent, 
without characterizing his conduct as criminally negligent. 
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"[Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a civil action for damages, 
is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 
267 (Utah 1988). There is criminal negligence only when all ordinary persons would 
recognize the risk of death. See State v. Warden. 784 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Utah App. 1989), 
reversed on other grounds. 813 P.2d 1146, 1153 (Utah 1991).16 
Ordinary persons would not have recognized a risk of death on the facts of this 
case, where it is unclear that a reasonable person in Larsen's position would even have 
seen the Subaru prior to the collision. The Subaru may well have come over the hill 
crest, and come out from the slow-moving car in the left lane (T. 113-115), and thus into 
Brett Larsen's range of view, after Larsen looked ahead on Wasatch Boulevard and saw 
that the way was clear, and properly diverted his attention to 38th South to insure that he 
made the turn accurately and without hitting any hazard on that street.17 Where the 
driver of the Subaru was speeding up a hill crest, and pulling out of the left lane to pass a 
slow-moving car immediately prior to or in the intersection (T. 113-115), he posed a risk 
of death that the ordinary person would not be expected to foresee or recognize. 
As the Court explained in State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Utah App. 
16
 The supreme court relied on the essentially the same definitions of criminal 
negligence as did this Court, but found that this Court should have deferred to the jury's 
resolution of conflicting evidence. 
17
 It should be remembered that the driver of the Subaru, King, testified that he did 
not see Larsen's truck until the collision (T. 118), confirming that King darted out of the left lane 
from behind the slower car suddenly before entering the intersection. 
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1989), reversed on other grounds, 813 P.2d 1146, 1153 (Utah 1991), 
Because the "failure to perceive the risk constitutes a gross deviation 
from the reasonable man standard," ordinary negligence adequate in the 
civil law is insufficient to constitute criminal negligence. State v. Chavez. 
605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1979); see also Standiford. 769 P.2d at 267; 2 
C. Torcia, Whartonfs Criminal Law § 168 (terms such as "criminal 
negligence" are intended to connote deviations from reasonableness 
significantly greater in degree than ordinary negligence). Thus, "mere 
inattention or mistake in judgment resulting even in death of another is not 
criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so." People v. Rodriguez. 
186 Cal. App. 2d 433, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (1960). 
Id. at 1208. 
Assuming that Brett Larsen could have seen the Subaru to yield to it prior to the 
collision, this case was at the most one of mere inattention or mistake in judgment. 
Under the plain terms of Warden, supra, Larsen's conduct did not amount to criminal 
negligence. See id. 
D. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE ON THE MERITS. 
Trial counsel did argue the insufficiency of the evidence to justify a negligent 
homicide conviction, primarily focusing on the lack of evidence of criminal, as opposed 
to civil, negligence, and also mentioning the duty of Mr. King to avoid Mr. Larsen's 
driving (T. 127-132). However, defense counsel never addressed the issue of causation, 
conceded that Larsen was simply, as opposed to criminally negligent, and did not bring 
the trial court's attention to the specific laws violated by King's driving pattern, or to 
18
 The supreme court relied on the essentially the same definitions of criminal 
negligence as did this Court, but found that this Court should have deferred to the jury's 
resolution of conflicting evidence. 
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King's gross negligence in driving as he did (T. 127-132). 
To the extent that trial counsel did not fully articulate the lack of evidence to 
justify the negligent homicide conviction, this Court should nonetheless address the issue 
on the merits under the plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
1. PLAIN ERROR 
To demonstrate plain error, Larsen must establish that an obvious and harmful 
error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the 
obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is 
more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See ej*. State v. 
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 1989). 
In the instant matter, the plain error which occurred, as described above, was the 
entry of a criminal conviction for negligent homicide without proof of causation or simple 
negligence, let alone criminal negligence. The State's obligations to prove causation, 
foreseeability and criminal negligence have been a clear matter of common law and 
statutory law for years in Utah. See e ^ Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (defining negligent 
homicide; enacted in 1973); State v. Hallett 619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980)(discussing 
causation element); Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 
1993) (discussing how foreseeability is required to establish both simple negligence and 
proximate cause); State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988)(distinguishing 
criminal negligence from civil); Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4)(defining criminal 
negligence; enacted in 1973 and last amended in 1974). 
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Particularly given the incontroverted nature of the evidence in this case, the lack 
of causation, foreseeability and criminal negligence should have been abundantly clear to 
the trial court. 
Assuming arguendo that the absence of proof of causation, foreseeability and 
criminal negligence should not have been obvious to the trial court, given the high degree 
of harm stemming from the unjustified conviction, including a one year jail sentence, the 
Court should nonetheless reverse the conviction. See State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 
35 n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 1989)(recognizing the appellate Court's 
authority to remedy serious errors which may not have been terribly obvious to the trial 
courts). 
2. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Larsen must demonstrate that 
trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, 
and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e ^ Parsons v. 
Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah ), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable 
probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. 
See e.g. State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). As was explained above, 
the State's obligation to prove causation, foreseeability and criminal negligence has been 
a clear matter of common law and statutory law for years in Utah. See e j ^ Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-206 (enacted in 1973); State v. Hallett. 619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 
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1980)(discussing causation element); Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d 
1342, 1346 (Utah 1993) (discussing how foreseeability is required to establish both 
simple negligence and proximate cause); State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 
1988)(distinguishing criminal negligence from civil); Utah Code Ann. §76-2-
103(4)(defining criminal negligence; enacted in 1973 and last amended in 1974). 
The failure of defense counsel to raise the obvious insufficiency of evidence on 
these key elements, and to leave his client with an unjustified homicide conviction was 
objectively deficient, and simply cannot be characterized as trial strategy. See e ^ United 
States v. McveigL 918 F. Supp. 1452, 1459 (W. D. Okla. 1996)("The focus of a defense 
lawyer's efforts is to assess the ability of the prosecution to establish guilt under the law 
and within the rules of evidence and procedure-not guilt in any moral or ethical sense. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-4.1 and Commentary at 4.54-4.55.") 
See also Utah Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for 
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal 
proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may 
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be 
established.").19 
19
 "Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards 
and the like, e. g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) ("The 
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1 
In the absence of trial counsel's objectively deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability that the result would have been different, and that Mr. Larsen 
would not be spending a year in jail for an offense he did not commit. 
See e.g. Lovell supra (to establish prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrine, defendant must show that in absence of objectively deficient performance, there 
is a reasonable probability that the result would have differed). 
Because Larsen has met the burdens required by the plain error and ineffective 
assistance doctrines, this Court should address the insufficiency of the evidence of 
negligent homicide fully on the merits. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO JUSTIFY THE CONVICTION FOR 
FAILURE TO YIELD. 
A. THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. 
The trial court's reasoning and ruling on the failure to yield count was as follows: 
As to Count 4, which is the failure to yield right-of-way, it's clear from the 
evidence that the Defendant, Mr. Larsen, intended to turn left at this 
intersection. He failed to yield to a vehicle coming from the opposite 
direction, which was so close to his own vehicle that it constituted an 
immediate hazard. I think all the facts here - 1 mean, they're 
incontroverted that that occurred, so I find Mr. Larsen guilty of failure to 
yield right-of-way. 
(R. 137). Later, in his ruling on the negligent homicide conviction, Judge Burton 
Defense Function"), are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides." 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668. 488 (1984). 
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recognized that Larsen did not see the Subaru. He stated, 
And obviously, the question upon which the whole case is focused 
and which is the most serious, of course, is the negligent homicide. A 
factor on that matter is, I think important to note, that Mr. J. Larsen notes 
that as the light turned green for Mr. Brett Larsen, that he waited a few 
moments, then he moved into the intersection. Mr. J. Larsen describes the 
turn as not being slow and not being fast, just a casual, normal turn, and I 
took it to mean that Mr. Brett Larsen was turning as if it were a clear 
intersection. 
And obviously, the question upon which the whole case is focused 
and which is the most serious, of course, is the negligent homicide. A 
factor on that matter is, I think important to note, that Mr. J. Larsen notes 
that as the light turned green for Mr. Brett Larsen, that he waited a few 
moments, then he moved into the intersection. Mr. J. Larsen describes the 
turn as not being slow and not being fast, just a casual, normal turn, and I 
took it to mean that Mr. Brett Larsen was turning as if it were a clear 
intersection. 
Mr. J. Larsen, sitting behind Mr. Brett Larsen, can see the other 
motor vehicle approaching the intersection, so it's clear that the vehicle was 
visible. And finally, Deputy Stratford tells us that Mr. Brett Larsen's truck 
tire was moving at the time of the impact, indicating that he made no effort 
to stop. 
Now, with those findings of fact, then we come to to the standard 
that must be applied, which both sides have recited. Should Mr. Brett 
Larsen have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was 
taking or which might occur when he took that risk? And was this risk of 
such a nature and degree that his failure to perceive it constituted a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from Mr. Brett Larsen's standpoint? 
And I have to say, though it's been ably argued and the facts 
presented, it's clear to me that this is a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person has to exercise. Were that not true, it would 
not be possible to drive a motor vehicle on any roadway that ever 
intersected with another roadway. 
I mean, Mr. Brett Larsen's actions today, due to these facts, has to 
be a gross deviation. Essentially, he drove into the intersection, turned left, 
and made no perceptive view of the oncoming traffic. And if one were to 
do that, and it would just be a simple deviation or to be the normal 
procedure, it could not be tolerated in any way. So on the count criminal — 




The following evidence is marshaled to support the trial court's factual analysis 
regarding the failure to yield count. 
J. Henry Larsen witnessed the collision and indicated that prior to entering the 
intersection, Larsen had stopped appropriately at a red light, waited a few moments after 
the light turned green, and then proceeded to turn directly through the intersection at a 
normal rate of speed, perhaps at ten or fifteen miles an hour (T. 58, 61). He and the 
State's accident reconstructionist agreed that neither the Subaru nor the Ranger made any 
effort to avoid one another (T. 72, 92). There were no skid marks from either car (T. 
83). 
The trial court's error was primarily legal. He failed to recognize that the failure 
to yield offense is not one of strict liability,20 but requires proof of a mens rea of 
knowledge. 
The statute defining the offense of failing to yield, Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73, 
provides, 
20
 Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102 provides, 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall 
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct 
prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
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The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the 
right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which 
is so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
The term yield itself implies knowledge of the hazard yielded to. While the Utah 
Code does not specifically define the term, Black's Law Dictionary defines the verb 
yield, in relevant part, as "To give up, relinquish, or surrender." The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary likewise defines the verb, in relevant part as "1: to give as fitting, owed or 
required" . . . "6 to give way (as to force or influence) 7: to give place syn relinquish, 
cede, waive, submit, capitulate, defer". 
The failure to yield statute imposes an affirmative duty to yield to another driver, 
and thus implicitly requires proof of a knowing mental state, for one can neither yield nor 
fail to yield to a hazard of which one is unaware. See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73, supra. 
See also LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, Chapter 3, §26, p. 187 (3rd Edition) ("Though 
one might otherwise be under a duty to act, so that omission to do so would ordinarily 
render him criminally liable, the prevailing view is that he may not be held liable if he 
does not know the facts indicating a duty to act."). 
Assuming that the failure to yield statute did not require proof of a knowing 
mental state, and a reckless mental state were all that is required, there is no proof of 
recklessness here, for the evidence indicated, and the trial court ruled, that Larsen failed 
to see the risk posed by the Subaru. See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 (3)(indicating that a 
person acts "[r]ecklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 
27 
{ 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint."). 
Assuming arguendo that the offense of failure to yield could be established by 
mere criminal negligence,21 none is established here, where Larsen reasonably could not 
have seen the Subaru in time to stop.22 By undisputed evidence including the Subaru 
driver's own admissions, the driver of the Subaru was going above the speed limit (T. 21, 
21
 Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) provides, that a person acts 
[w]ith criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought 
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
22
 See Charvos v. Cottrell 361 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1961)("Before the duty of a 
driver to yield the right of way arises he must be in a situation whereby he is either aware of the 
presence of a pedestrian within the crosswalk or should have, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
become aware of the pedestrian's presence in time to yield the right of way."). 
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115, 71-72)23 while approaching an intersection and at the crest of a hill (T. 113-115),24 
and came out of the left lane from behind a slower car and passed the in the right-hand 
lane (T. 113),25 while perhaps mildly distracted, without maintaining a proper lookout,26 
without insuring that it was safe to do so (T. 115-116, 118, 119),27 and immediately prior 
to or while he was entering an intersection.28 
The driver behind Larsen, J. Henry Larsen, could only see King's Subaru from 50 
to 75 yards away prior to the collision (T. 69), and estimated that it was traveling at 45 to 
23
 The State's accident reconstructionist was unable to determine the speed of the 
Subaru because of insufficient data (T. 91). 
Larsen's motion for a remand pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B and 
accompanying affidavit allege that Larsen's mother provided trial counsel with evidence that the 
combined speed of the cars involved in the accident was between 110 and 120 miles an hour. 
Larsen renews his motion for a remand, should the Court not otherwise reverse his conviction for 
negligent homicide. 
24
 Utah law recognizes intersections and hill crests as hazards which normally may 
require driving under the posted speed limit. See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-46(l)(a) and (c). 
25
 Utah drivers are generally to pass in the left-hand lane, and are to pass on the right 
only when it is safe to do so. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-55 (indicating drivers are to pass 
in the left lane) with Utah Code Ann. §41-6-56 (stating conditions in which one may pass on the 
right). 
26
 The law recognizes the duty of all drivers to maintain a proper lookout. 
See Richards v. Palace Laundrv Co.. 186 P. 439, 442 (Utah 1919); Martin v. Sheffield. 189 P.2d 
127, 130-131 (Utah 1948); Hughes v. Hooper. 431 P.2d 983, 983-84 (1967); Country Club 
Foods v. Barney. 352 P.2d 776, 777 (Utah 1960); Childs v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 434 (Utah 
1998). 
27
 Utah drivers are generally to pass in the left-hand lane, and are to pass on the right 
only when it is safe to do so. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-55 (indicating drivers are to pass 
in the left lane) with Utah Code Ann. §41-6-56 (stating conditions in which one may pass on the 
right). 
28
 Utah Code Ann. §41-6-58 is interpreted as forbidding cars to pass within one 
hundred feet of an intersection. See Hathaway v. Marx. 439 P.2d 850, 850 (Utah 1968). 
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55 miles an hour (T. 71-72). The Subaru was obviously closer to Brett Larsen than it 
was to J. Henry Larsen, and a car traveling at the rate of the Subaru covers such a 
distance quickly. See e ^ State in re K.K.H.. 610 P.2d 849, 855-56 (Utah 1980)("It 
should be observed that a vehicle traveling 25 miles per hour moves at the rate of 36.6 
feet per second and one traveling 30 miles per hour at the rate of 44 feet per second."). 
King testified that he did not see Larsen's truck until the collision (T. 118), confirming 
that King darted out of the left lane from behind the slower car suddenly before entering 
the intersection. 
Acting within the reasonable course of care, Larsen could not have reasonably 
foreseen King's grossly negligent driving, which resulted in the Subaru's sudden 
emergence in the intersection. The driver behind Larsen, J. Henry Larsen, could only see 
King's Subaru from 50 to 75 yards away prior to the collision (T. 69), and estimated that 
it was traveling at 45 to 55 miles an hour (T. 71-72). The Subaru was obviously closer 
to Brett Larsen than it was to J. Henry Larsen, and a car traveling at the rate of the Subaru 
covers such a distance quickly at the rate of speed being driven by the Subaru. See 
e.g. State in re K.K.H.. 610 P.2d 849, 855-56 (Utah 1980)("It should be observed that a 
vehicle traveling 25 miles per hour moves at the rate of 36.6 feet per second and one 
traveling 30 miles per hour at the rate of 44 feet per second."). The Subaru may well 
have come over the hill crest, and come out from the slow-moving car in the left lane and 
thus into Brett Larsen's range of view after Larsen looked ahead on Wasatch Boulevard 
and saw that the way was clear, and properly diverted his attention to 38th South to 
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insure that he made the turn accurately and without hitting any hazard on that street. 
On these facts, Larsen was not criminally negligent in having failed to yield to the 
reasonably unforeseen Subaru. Cf. Charvos v. Cottrell 361 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 
1961)("Before the duty of a driver to yield the right of way arises he must be in a 
situation whereby he is either aware of the presence of a pedestrian within the crosswalk 
or should have, in the exercise of reasonable care, become aware of the pedestrian's 
presence in time to yield the right of way."). 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE. 
Trial counsel did not move to dismiss count 4, or argue insufficiency of the 
evidence, but left the issue to the trial court's discretion in closing arguments (Docket 
page 6, T. 126-132). 
To the extent that the issue was not properly preserved, this Court should address 
the merits of the issue under the plain error doctrine and/or ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrine. 
1. PLAIN ERROR 
To demonstrate plain error, Larsen must establish that an obvious and harmful 
error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the 
obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is 
more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See e ^ State v. 
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 1989). 
In the instant matter, the plain error which occurred, as described above, was the 
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entry of a criminal conviction without any proof of mens rea. The State's obligation to 
prove mens rea has been a clear matter of common law and statutory law for years in 
Utah. See e ^ State v. Elton. 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984)("The Utah Criminal Code 
follows the common law in establishing the basic proposition that a person cannot be 
found guilty of a criminal offense unless he harbors a requisite criminal state of mind or 
unless the prohibited act is based on strict liability.9'); Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102 ("Every 
offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and when the 
definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not 
involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the 
offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for 
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any 
culpable mental state.").29 
The absence of mens rea should have been abundantly clear to the trial court, 
particularly given his tacit recognition that Larsen did not see the Subaru (T. 137-139). 
Assuming arguendo that the absence of proof of mens rea should not have been 
obvious to the trial court, given the high degree of harm stemming from the unjustified 
conviction, including a three month jail sentence, the Court should nonetheless reverse 
the conviction. See State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah), cert denied, 493 
This statute was enacted in 1973, and last amended in 1983. 
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U.S. 814 1989)(recognizing the appellate Court's authority to remedy serious errors 
which may not have been terribly obvious to the trial courts). 
2. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Larsen must demonstrate that 
trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, 
and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e ^ Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice prong 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable probability 
of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. See e.g. 
State v. LovelL 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
As was explained above, the State's obligation to prove mens rea has been a clear 
matter of common law and statutory law for years in Utah. See e.g. State v. Elton. 680 
P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984); Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102.30 
The failure of defense counsel to raise the obvious insufficiency of evidence on the 
key point of mens rea was an objectively deficient failure to raise the most obvious 
defense to a charge carrying a three month jail sentence, and simply cannot be 
characterized as trial strategy. For "[t]he focus of a defense lawyer's efforts is to assess 
the ability of the prosecution to establish guilt under the law and within the rules of 
evidence and procedure--not guilt in any moral or ethical sense. ABA Standards for 
This statute was enacted in 1973, and last amended in 1983. 
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Criminal Justice, Standard 4-4.1 and Commentary at 4.54-4.55." United States v. 
McveigL 918 F. Supp. 1452, 1459 (W. D. Okla. 1996). See also Utah Rule of 
Professional Responsibility 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or 
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal 
of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in 
a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding 
as to require that every element of the case be established.").31 
In the absence of this objectively deficient performance, there is a reasonable 
probability that the result would have been different, and that Mr. Larsen would not be 
spending three months in jail for an offense he did not commit. See e,g, Lovell supra (to 
establish prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine, defendant must 
show that in absence of objectively deficient performance, there is a reasonable 
probability that the result would have differed). 
CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the relevant law and evidence, this Court should conclude that the 
convictions for negligent homicide and failure to yield were "against the clear weight of 
the evidence," and should reach "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
31
 "Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards 
and the like, e. g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) ("The 
Defense Function" ), are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides." 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 488 (1984). 
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made" as a result of the trial court's erroneous legal reasoning in entering those 
convictions. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)(discussing applicable 
standard of review of results of a bench trial). 
Based on the analysis provided in this brief, the Court should reverse the 
convictions for negligent homicide and failure to yield, and order those two charges 
dismissed for insufficient evidence. 
Dated this S i day of O ^ T b Le^- . 1999. 
MANNY GARCIA 
Counsel for Mr. Larsen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, Manny Garcia, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered/mailed, 
first class postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Sirena 
Wissler, Deputy District Attorney, 2001 South State, Suite 3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84190, this ^ d a y o ^ 7 ^ f e u 9 9 9 . 
MANNY GARCIA 
Attorney for Mr. Larsen 
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Constitution of Utah, Article I §12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
tobe confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining 
whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as 
defined by statute or rule. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have bene committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses agaisnt him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining wintesses in his favor, and to ahve 
the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Utah Code Ann. §32A-12-209 
(1) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to 
purchase, attempt to purchase, solicit another person to purchase, possess, 
or consume any alcoholic beverage or product, unless specifically 
authorized by this title. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to 
misrepresent his age, or for any other person to misrepresent the age of a 
minor, for the purpose of purchasing or otherwise obtaining an alcoholic 
beverage or product for a minor. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to possess 
or consume any alcoholic beverage while riding in a limousine or chartered 
bus. 
(4) When a person who is at least 13 years old, but younger than 18 
years old, is found by the court to have violated this section, the provisions 
regarding suspension of the driver's license under Section 78-3a-506 apply 
to the violation. 
(5) When the court has issued an order suspending a person's driving 
privileges for a violation of this section, the Driver License Division shall 
suspend the person's license under the provisions of Section 53-3-219. 
(6) When the Department of Public Safety receives the arrest or 
conviction record of a person for a driving offense committed while his 
license is suspended pursuant to this section, the department shall extend 
the suspension for an additional like period of time. 
(7) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a 
motor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle 
is moving, stopped, or parked on any highway. 
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow 
another to keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment 
of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container 
which contains any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its 
seal broken, or the contents of the container partially consumed. 
(3) In this section: 
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning given in Section 
32A-1-105. 
(b) "Chartered bus" has the meaning given in Section 
32A-1-105. 
(c) "Limousine" has the meaning given in Section 
32A-1-105. 
(d) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle 
normally occupied by the operator and passengers and includes areas 
accessible to them while traveling, such as a utility or glove compartment, 
but does not include a separate front or rear trunk compartment or other 
area of the vehicle not accessible to the operator or passengers while inside 
the vehicle. 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers in the 
living quarters of a motor home or camper. 
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers traveling in 
any licensed taxicab or bus. 
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers who 
have carried their own alcoholic beverage onto a limousine or chartered bus 
that is in compliance with Subsections 32A-12-213(l)(b) and (c). 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-46 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad 
grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, 
weather, or highway conditions. 
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (4) and 
Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as 
defined in Section 41-6-20.1; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and 
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed in excess of 
the limits provided in this section or established under Section 41-6-47 or 
41-6-48, is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent 
and that it is unlawful. 
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may 
change the speed limits on the highways of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-55 
The overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same 
direction is subject to the following provisions: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding 
in the same direction shall pass to the left at a safe distance and may not 
again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the 
overtaken vehicle. 
(2) The operator of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right 
in favor of the overtaking vehicle and may not increase the speed of his 
vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle. 
(3) On a highway having more than one lane in the same direction, 
the operator of a vehicle traveling in a left lane shall, upon being overtaken 
by another vehicle in the same lane, yield to the over-taking vehicle by 
moving safely to the right, and may not impede the movement or free flow 
of traffic in a left lane except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction; 
(b) when preparing to turn left; 
(c) when reasonably necessary in response to emergency conditions; 
(d) to avoid actual or potential traffic moving onto the right lane from 
an acceleration or merging lane; or 
(e) when necessary to follow direction signs that direct use of a lane 
other than the right lane. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-56 
(1) The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of 
another vehicle only: 
(a) when the vehicle overtaken is making or preparing to make a left 
turn; 
(b) upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width 
for two or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being 
traveled by the overtaking vehicle; or 
(c) upon a one-way highway, or upon any roadway on which traffic 
is restricted to one direction of movement, where the roadway is free from 
obstructions and of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving 
vehicles. 
(2) The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle 
upon the right only under conditions permitting the movement with safety. 
The movement may not be made by driving off the roadway. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-58 
(1) A vehicle may not be operated on the left side of the roadway: 
(a) when approaching or on a crest of a grade or a curve 
on the highway where the operator's view is obstructed within 
a distance which creates a hazard if another vehicle may 
approach from the opposite direction; 
(b) when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing 
any intersection or railroad grade crossing unless otherwise 
indicated by official traffic-control devices or a peace officer; 
or 
^ (c) when the view is obstructed upon approaching within 
100 feet of any bridge, viaduct, or tunnel 
(2) This section does not apply on a one-way roadway, nor under 
the conditions described in Subsection 41-6-53(l)(b) nor to the operator of 
a vehicle turning left onto or from an alley, private road, or driveway. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the 
right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which 
is so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-118 
(a) Every vehicle upon a highway within this state at any time from a 
half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise and at any other time 
when, due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, 
persons and vehicles on the highway are not clearly discernible at a 
distance of 1,000 feet ahead shall display lighted lamps and other lamps and 
illuminating devices as respectively required for different classes of 
vehicles, subject to exceptions with respect to parked vehicles, and further 
that stop lights, turn signals and other signaling devices shall be lighted as 
prescribed for the use of such devices. 
(b) Whenever requirement is hereinafter declared as to distance from 
which certain lamps and devices shall render objects visible or within 
which such lamps or devices shall be visible, said provisions shall apply 
during the times stated in Subsection (a) in respect to a vehicle without load 
when upon a straight, level, unlighted highway under normal atmospheric 
conditions, unless a different time or condition is expressly stated. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable 
mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose 
criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances 
surroundmg his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by 
counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance 
of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district where the offense is alleged to have been 
committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions 
of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 days after 
arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the 
court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay 
the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband nor a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a 
jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a 
judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in 
case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case 
may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of 
findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only 
upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record 
on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. 
Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed 
after the filing of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a 
motion to be filed after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the 
court from remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time 
if the claim has been raised and the motion would have been available to a 
party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion 
shall conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or 
be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record 
on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered 
bythe appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The 
motion shall also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that 
identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant 
to each such claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. 
The response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, 
unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any 
reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this 
rule have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily 
remanded to the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact 
relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand 
shall identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues 
relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order 
shall also direct the trial court to complete the proceedings on remand 
within 90 days of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by the 
trial court: of good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of 
record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall 
direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be 
appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall 
be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other 
procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for 
remand, unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of 
the parties or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court 
shall promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the 
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand 
shall notbe considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court 
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require 
consideration of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. 
Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as 
practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the 
proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the 
evidence. The trial court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the 
claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice 
suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand. 
Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the 
order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay of 
reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental 
proceedings as required by these rules. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record of the 
supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record. If 
the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has not been 
transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the 
record of the supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of the entire 
record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from 
the trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new 
schedule for briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to 
have been made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to 
this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in 
other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable 
under the same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
5 8A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and 
(b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings aind may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be 
made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of 
fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court 
an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a 
motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in 
actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived 
by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Utah Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.1 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a 
criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in 
incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that 
every element of the case be established. 
Mr. Larsen be held accountable for the same. Thank 
you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. As to Count 4, 
which is the failure to yield right-of-way, it's 
clear from the evidence that the Defendant, 
Mr. Larsen, intended to turn left at this 
intersection. He failed to yield to a vehicle coming 
from the opposite direction, which was so close to 
his own vehicle that it constituted an immediate 
hazard. I think all the facts here -- I mean, 
they're uncontroverted that that occurred, so I find 
Mr. Larsen guilty of failure to yield right-of-way. 
As to the charge carrying or possessing an 
open container of alcohol, it's clear the State has 
shown that he carried -- Mr. Larsen carried or 
transported in the passenger compartment of his 
truck, and it was done on a public street, a 
container of alcohol, which is the exhibit here, that 
it had been opened and the contents were partially 
removed, so I find Mr. Larsen guilty of the open 
container. 
On the charge possession and/or consumption 
by a minor, it's clear that, at the time of this 
event, Mr. Larsen was under the age of 21 years, and 
by Mr. Beck's testimony, he had consumed alcohol, for 
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it was in his bloodstream, and so he's guilty of the 
possession by a minor. 
And obviously, the question upon which the 
whole case is focused and which is the most serious, 
of course, is the negligent homicide. A factor on 
that matter is, I think important to note, that Mr. 
J. Larsen notes that as the light turned green for 
Mr. Brett Larsen, that he waited a few moments, then 
he moved into the intersection. Mr. J. Larsen 
describes the turn as not being slow and not being 
fast, just a casual, normal turn, and I took it to 
mean that Mr. Brett Larsen was turning as if it were 
a clear intersection. 
Mr. J. Larsen, sitting behind Mr. Brett 
Larsen, can see the other motor vehicle approaching 
the intersection, so it's clear that that vehicle was 
visible. And finally, Deputy Stratford tells us that 
Mr. Brett Larsen's truck tire was moving at the time 
of the impact, indicating that he made no effort to 
stop. 
Now, with those findings of fact, then we 
come to the standard that must be applied, which both 
sides have recited. Should Mr. Brett Larsen have 
been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that he was taking or which might occur when he took 
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1 that risk? And was this risk of such a nature and 
2 degree that his failure to perceive it constituted a 
3 gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
4 ordinary person would exercise in all the 
5 circumstances as viewed from Mr. Brett Larsen's 
6 standpoint? 
7 And I have to say, though it's been ably 
8 argued and the facts presented, it's clear to me that 
9 this is a gross deviation from the standard of care 
10 that an ordinary person has to exercise. Were that 
11 not true, it would not be possible to drive a motor 
12 vehicle on any roadway that ever intersected with 
13 another roadway. 
14 I mean, Mr. Brett Larsen's actions today, 
15 due to these facts, has to be a gross deviation. 
16 Essentially, he drove into the intersection, turned 
17 left, and made no perceptive view of the oncoming 
18 traffic. And if one were to do that, and it would 
19 just be a simple deviation or to be the normal 
20 procedure, it could not be tolerated in any way. So 
21 on the count criminal — negligent homicide, I find 
22 the Defendant guilty based on the facts presented. 
23 Now, Mr. Becker, I guess it behooves the 
24 Defendant to decide when he wants to be sentenced, 
25 because the statute says that he has the right to do 
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